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A b s t r a c t Objectives: Quantitative evaluation of safety after the implementation of a computerized
provider order entry (CPOE) system, stratification of residual risks to drive future developments.
Design: Comparative risk analysis of the drug prescription process before and after the implementation of CPOE
system, according to the Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) method.
Measurements: The failure modes were defined and their criticality indices calculated on the basis of the
likelihood of occurrence, potential severity for patients, and detection probability. Criticality indices of
handwritten and electronic prescriptions were compared, the acceptability of residual risks was discussed. Further
developments were proposed and their potential impact on the safety was estimated.
Results: The sum of criticality indices of 27 identified failure modes was 3813 for the handwritten prescription,
2930 (23%) for CPOE system, and 1658 (57%) with 14 enhancements. The major safety improvements were
observed for errors due to ambiguous, incomplete or illegible orders (245 points), wrong dose determination
(217) and interactions (196). Implementation of targeted pop-ups to remind treatment adaptation (189), vital
signs (140), and automatic edition of documents needed for the dispensation (126) were the most promising
proposed improvements.
Conclusion: The impact of a CPOE system on patient safety strongly depends on the implemented functions and
their ergonomics. The use of risk analysis helps to quantitatively evaluate the relationship between a system and
patient safety and to build a strategy for continuous quality improvement, by selecting the most appropriate
improvements to the system. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2008;15:453–460. DOI 10.1197/jamia.M2677.Introduction
In the last few years, patient safety issues have become a major
concern in healthcare and an important target for the use of
information technologies. Preventable fatal medical errors of
all types have been estimated to cause between 44,000 and
98,000 deaths per year in the USA1,2 and as many as 7,000 of
that total are estimated to occur due to medication-related
errors.3,4 A well-designed study prospectively measured a rate
of 6.5 adverse drug events per 100 admissions, of which 28%
were preventable, with errors occurring at the stage of ordering
(49%), transcription (11%), dispensing (14%) and administra-
tion (26%).5
Health care processes are complex, and they rely primarily on
the performance of humans in difficult environments with
high cognitive loads. In medication prescribing, the perfor-
mance of highly trained operators has been shown to be
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tion6,7 and 10% for dose calculation.7,8 Significant efforts are
underway to prevent human errors and improve patient
safety. Many hospitals are investing in information technolo-
gies (IT), with the hope of improving patient safety.9 Informa-
tion technologies may simplify manual or cognitive steps
leading to high error rates, and they target systems rather than
individuals, a strategy that has been shown to be effective in
reducing errors in other fields such as aviation industry.10
For these reasons, the use of information technologies in
drug prescription and administration has received consid-
erable attention in recent years. Computerised provider
order entry (CPOE) system refers to a variety of computer-
based systems that share the common features of supporting
the drug ordering process and to improve standardised,
legible, and complete orders.11 Clinical decision support
systems (CDSS) are built into most CPOE systems with
varying degrees of sophistication, from providing basic
computerised advice limited to drug databases such as
doses, routes, frequencies and interactions up to complete
integration within a computerized patient record along
pathways with drug allergy, drug-laboratory checking and
complete workflow management.
Numerous publications have described the positive impact
of CPOE systems and CDSS on medication safety (see
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have demonstrated an important decrease of 55 to 81% in
the rate of serious medication errors after the implementa-
tion of CPOE systems.13,14 When the results are analyzed
according to steps in the process from ordering to adminis-
tration, it is interesting to note that CPOE system diminished
ordering errors by only 19%, whereas transcription (84%),
dispensing (68%) and administration (59%) errors were
more markedly reduced.13 The reduction in ordering errors
is strongly dependent of the exhaustiveness of the CDSS
integrated with the prescription tool.
CPOE systems can also have negative effects, and some
recent papers have emphasized the problems that can
ensue after introduction of computerized prescriptions. In
one study, a CPOE system was shown to have increased 22
types of medication risks.15 This publication led to an
intense debate, because the system used was considered to
be obsolete.16 In a second study, an increased mortality from
2.8 to 6.6% was observed in a paediatric referral centre after
the implementation of a commercially sold CPOE system.17
This unexpected result was only partially attributable to the
new prescribing tool itself, and the induced major changes
in the process organization and the communication channels
seemed to play a key role.
These results highlight the difficulty of ensuring a successful
implementation, which is influenced not only by the quality
and the exhaustiveness of the system itself, but also by
numerous external technical, organisational, cultural and
human factors. Owing to the complexity of each institution
and their heterogeneity, a success-story with a system in a
specific hospital cannot be considered to be a sufficient
guarantee for a safe implementation in another one. More-
over, many different commercial and home-made systems
are available, and each of them needs to be carefully
evaluated. To increase the chance of successful implemen-
tation, the development of evaluation and certification meth-
ods is highly desirable,18,19 and mechanisms for feedback
and continuous improvements should be in place.20
Medication error reporting systems have been used to assess
the impact of CPOE systems, but these methods have
inherent biases due to voluntary reporting and retrospective
analysis.21,22,23 The Leapfrog group adopted general quality
standards for evaluating the safety of CPOE systems. The
evaluation methodology simulates different clinical scenar-
ios using a wide variety of test patients to determine how a
CPOE system responds to unsafe medication ordering and
clinical situations. The results assist hospitals in identifying
needed improvements in their current CPOE systems.24
In order to improve the reliability of CPOE systems but also
to assess their effects on safety, there has been a growing in
employing prospective risk analysis approaches used in a
number of other high hazard industries, such as nuclear
power or aviation.25 In the United States, the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO) has,
since July 1, 2001 required each accredited hospital to
conduct at least one proactive risk assessment annually.26
Among these methods, Failure Modes, Effects and Critical-
ity Analysis (FMECA) is a well described tool that was
recommended both by the VA National Center for Patient
Safety27 and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement(IHI).28 It identifies possible or likely errors (“failure mode”)
and gauges what their effect will be, even before they take
place. Unlike FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis)
which is only qualitative, FMECA includes a quantitative
evaluation of the criticality of each failure mode. The criti-
cality indices are calculated by multiplying three compo-
nents—likelihood of occurrence, severity and detection—on
the basis of known or estimated data. FMECA compares the
top critical events in different process organisations, allow-
ing a simple measurement of the potential impact of new
solutions on patient safety. The method was originally
developed to assess risk in major projects, especially in the
aerospace industry. By providing a structured analysis of a
process based on the combined experience of several pro-
fessionals having different point of views, FMECA helps to
decide whether a risk is acceptable or not and to estimate the
potential impact of different improvement scenarios, prior
to their implementation. A drawback is the relative subjec-
tivity of the analysis which produces results that are not
appropriate for statistical analysis. As the main goal is to
reflect the perception of risk by the participants and to be a
decision tool, this disadvantage does not limit the potential
utility of the method.
We started to apply FMECA in our hospital when reengi-
neering the paediatric parenteral nutrition production29 and
the anticancer chemotherapy process,30 with significant re-
ductions in the estimated criticality. The method has proven
to be a useful tool, and we decided to apply it to other
high-risk processes.
The objective of the current study was to perform a compar-
ative risk analysis of drug prescribing before and after the
implementation of a computerized patient record including
a CPOE system, to compare the risks to patient safety in the
manual and computerized systems, and to identify any
major residual risks in the computerized system that should
be the target of additional action.
Methods
Setting and System Description
The setting for the study was the Geneva university hos-
pitals, a consortium of hospitals on four campuses and more
than 30 ambulatory facilities, comprising 2,200 beds, 5,000
care providers, over 45,000 admissions and 750,000 outpa-
tients’ visits each year. It covers the whole range of in- and
outpatient care, from primary to tertiary facilities. A com-
puterized patient record (CPR) mostly developed in-house
is used in all facilities and runs on more than 4,500 PCs.
The CPR is based on a component-based architecture and a
message oriented middleware. It is written using Java. The
CPR includes a CPOE system, called “Presco”. It is a global
order entry platform for all orders, including drugs, radiol-
ogy, laboratory, nursing care among other. When the risk
analysis was performed (summer 2006), the system was
running in inpatient facilities with a total of 1,200 beds. The
deployment is in progress for the rest of inpatients and for
outpatient clinics. Decision support includes all basic infor-
mation on drug, including all specific rules for paediatrics
orders; it supports orders sets, various kinds of alerts and
reminders. It is tightly linked with the CPR allowing rules
based on laboratory or other clinical information.
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ing is performed by nurses, from a ward stock, without
systematic review by a hospital pharmacist. The “last mile”
is not yet computerized, that is the nurses do still have to
manage by hand the preparation and administration. The
stock is refilled by global orders to the central pharmacy.
FMECA Risk Analysis
This analysis was performed in the service of general
internal medicine according to the methodology previously
described.30,31
Team Definition
For the analysis, a team was created consisting of two
physicians and two nurses using the CPOE system, two
representatives of the medical informatics department (a
physician and a developer), a pharmacist and a psychologist
with a masters degree in informatics and ergonomics. Phy-
sicians and nurses were selected by the head of service, on
the basis of their daily use of the CPOE system and their
interest in the improvement approach. They were also asked
to represent their colleagues’ opinions and to consult them if
necessary during the analysis. The medical informatics rep-
resentatives were the most involved people in daily devel-
opment and implementation of the CPOE system.
Failure Modes Definition
The analysis was limited to drug management, including all
direct decision support such as drug-drug interactions,
laboratory checks and order sets for example (i.e., Labora-
tory analysis). The process considered extended from pre-
scription by physicians up to administration of the drug to
patients by nurses and further review by physicians. The
decomposition of the whole process into steps characterized
with specific failure modes was made by the team, driven by
a specialist in the FMECA approach. This was the major
initial task performed by the team.
A brainstorming session was organised to determine the
ways the process could fail at each step. The team had to
answer to the following question “What could possibly go
wrong within this process step? Each participant first
worked individually and a Delphi discussion method was
then used to analyze all propositions, to aggregate similar
topics, and to finalize the list of failure modes.
Criticality Analysis
The likelihood of occurrence (incidence) for each failure
mode was classified from 1 to 10, the severity of the potential
effect for the patient from 1 to 9, and the chance of detecting
the failure before it affected patient safety from 1 to 9.
Estimates were obtained by team consensus for all failure
modes, taking into account the local context and workload.
Most of the time, no quantitative data were available and the
scoring was based on the practical experience of the partic-
ipants. The evaluation was carried out on the basis of
explicit criteria, published elsewhere30 and was as consistent
as possible with published information of similar events.
The criteria were applied to all items.
For each failure mode, the criticality index was simply
calculated by multiplying the determined frequency, effect
and detection scores (minimum: 1, maximum: 810). Results
were summarized in figures comparing the criticality indi-
ces for each mode of failure before and after CPOE system
implementation.The criticality indices were analysed by the team to measure
the evolution of risks from the handwritten to the electronic
process. The sum of all individual criticality indices was
calculated for each process and then compared to determine
the global improvement in the safety and the potential
impact on patient outcome.
Acceptability and further Improvements
For each mode of failure, the change in criticality was
discussed and the acceptability of the residual risk was
evaluated. When it was not considered to be appropriate,
additional improvements to the system were proposed.
Their potential impact was estimated by a consensual view
of their effect on the previously determined frequency
and/or detection. The reduction in criticality that could
potentially be obtained by implementing all proposed im-
provements was calculated (“improved CPOE system”).
Development priorities were defined based on the criticality
of the failure mode, the estimated impact of each proposed
improvement and its feasibility.
Results
Failure Modes Definition
The process was split into four major steps: therapy selection
and prescription modalities, formal prescription, order man-
agement by nurses and treatment follow-up and adaptation.
Twenty seven failure modes were determined during the
brainstorming.
Criticality Analysis
The sum of criticality indices was 3,813 for the handwritten
prescription and 2,930 for the actual CPOE system, which
represents a 23 % reduction in total criticality (Figure 1). The
criticality indices calculated from the defined frequency,
severity and detection scores for each of the failure modes
are illustrated in Figures 2 to 5, for the four major steps of
the process.
For 12 out of 27 failure modes, the criticality index was
smaller with the CPOE system than handwritten orders. The
reduction of individual indices varied from 7 to 245, with a
mean reduction of 103. The larger reductions of the criti-
cality were observed for errors due to ambiguous, incom-
plete or illegible orders (245), wrong dose determination
or adaptation (217) and drug interactions not consid-
ered (196). For 6 failure modes, the risk remained
F i g u r e 1. Evolution of the total criticality indices in the
three studied process organizations.unchanged, and an increase was calculated for the re-
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4 to 140, with a mean increase of 39. The larger increases
of the criticality were observed for vital signs not consid-
ered during treatment adaptation (140) and prescription
to a wrong patient (84).
The highest risks in the handwritten process were computed
for errors due to ambiguous, incomplete or illegible orders
(CI  392), drug interaction not considered (343), contra-
indications not considered (294), treatment adaptation for-
gotten (294), and wrong dose determination or adaptation
(280). With the actual CPOE system, the most critical steps
were contra-indications not considered (294), treatment ad-
aptation forgotten (294), and choice of the wrong active
substance for the disease (245), three critical failure modes
F i g u r e 3. Formal prescrip-
tion: failure modes and criticality
indices.that were not improved by the CPOE system, as well as vital
signs not considered (245).
Acceptability and Further Improvements
The criticalities calculated for the actual CPOE system were
examined to evaluate their acceptability. For fourteen mode
of failures (11 of them having a criticality index over 100),
the risk was considered to be unacceptable and further
developments were then proposed to lead to an improved
CPOE system, bringing these modes into acceptable ranges.
Their impact on criticality was evaluated (Figures 2–5) and
the reduction of individual indices varied from 4 to 189, with
a mean reduction of 91 points. The larger reductions of the
criticality were calculated for treatment adaptation forgotten
(189), contra-indications not considered (168), vital signs
F i g u r e 2. Therapy selection
and prescription modalities: fail-
ure modes and criticality indices.
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documents forgotten (126). In the case of an implementa-
tion of all the proposed improvements, the sum of the
criticality indices for the new CPOE system would be 1658.
This would correspond to an additional 43% reduction of
the criticality in comparison with the actual CPOE system
and a total 57% reduction in comparison with the handwrit-
ten process (Figure 1).
As all the improvements couldn’t be developed simulta-
neously, a classification was established by considering the
value of the criticality index in the actual CPOE system, the
extent of the expected reduction in criticality and the vol-
ume of work needed to develop the proposal (Table 1). Five
developments impacting six failure modes were prioritized
and their implementation expected to reduce the total criti-
cality from 2930 to 2171 (759), a 26% and 43% reduction in
comparison with the actual CPOE system and the handwrit-
ten process, respectively.
Discussion
The FMECA method confirmed a significant safety improve-
ment consecutive to the implementation of CPOE system.
F i g u r e 4. Order management
by nurses: failure modes and
criticality indices.More important, it helped to have quantitative measurements
of several steps in this complex process as well as to improve
understanding of system changes and their potential impacts
on safety. An important outcome of this work is to establish the
link between specific functionalities of a CPOE system and
patient safety, taking into account the local context. For exam-
ple, as our system already included drug-interactions checks,
this tool was estimated to significantly reduce this specific risk.
In contrast, as the CPOE system wasn’t able to take into
account previously documented allergies, this aspect of the
system was perceived as having a negative impact on safety.
These findings are consistent with the conclusions of Gandhi
et al, who addressed the need for advanced CDSSs to signifi-
cantly prevent potentially harmful errors.32 Although CDSSs
are expected to improve the quality of drug prescription
by providing useful information to the physician, our
study also confirmed that CPOE systems first improve
safety by making the orders unequivocal, complete and
legible, as the greatest reduction in criticalities was com-
puted for this failure mode. This safety gain can be
obtained by every CPOE system.
The implementation of information technologies can also
introduce new risks. In our case, the criticality of 9 out of 27
F i g u r e 5. Treatment follow-up
and adaption: failure modes and
criticality indices.
med
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we estimated that the safety improvements were quantita-
tively higher than the reductions. The analysis provided
support for the identification and prioritization of additional
developments targeted to failure modes for which the criti-
cality was judged to be unacceptable.
Modification of processes to accommodate the CPOE
system can have a negative impact on safety, as exempli-
fied by the consideration of vital signs during ordering. In
the handwritten process, the physicians used to check
vital signs easily, as they were available in the same file as
the prescription sheet, but this was not the case in the
CPOE system. Physicians therefore consulted them less
frequently, inducing a higher risk of establishing a pre-
scription without taking into consideration some impor-
tant parameters. The evaluation of the impact of vital
signs integration on risk reduction led to the assignment
of a high priority to the implementation of this new
function.
Our study confirms the importance of a systematic evalua-
tion of the impact of CPOE system implementation on
patient safety. One single method cannot consider all the
different aspects of this very complex process change. A
combination of several techniques, both reactive and proac-
tive, is strongly recommended to promote continuous im-
provement in efficiency and safety. The major benefits of
using FMECA as proactive risk analysis method are its
simplicity and the quantitative evaluation it allows by
combining three complementary factors. The evaluation can
be easily performed by the users and developers themselves,
with the help of a moderator, and the time required is
Table 1 y Priority Table for Further CPOE System Imp
Failure Mode CI CPOE Im
Treatment adaptation forgotten 294 Targeted pop-up a
Contra-indication not considered 294 Link between a pa
and drugs contr
Vital signs not considered 245 Integration of vital
patient record
Choice of the wrong active
substance for the disease
245 Link between the d
indication of the
Antibiotic iv-po switch forgotten 210 Pop-up alerts to pr
predefine criteri
Wrong patient 196 Improve the reada
Retranscription on dispensation
documents forgotten
168 Automatic edition
dispensation
Drug interaction not considered 147 Keep the same ale
prescription vali
Known allergy not considered 144 Structured alerts d
Retranscription error on
dispensation documents
140 Automatic edition
dispensation
Drug monitoring or biological
follow-up not considered
112 Automatic proposa
related to the pr
Administration modalities not
specified
49 Include reconstitut
modalities in the
Monitoring not prescribed 32 New homepage w
System unavailability 10 Improve the reliab
CI criticality index, Feasibility: 1 actually under development, 2limited. In our case, the team’s work required 4 pizzalunches of 2 hours each, plus 3–4 hours for the moderator to
summarize the results. The analysis identifies the top critical
events and quantifies the potential impact of process mod-
ifications, even before they have been implemented, which is
very helpful for assigning priorities actions to be taken.
Moreover, the active discussions necessary to find consensus
estimates contribute to the development of a very clear and
shared vision of the process organisation, taking into ac-
count all the different perspectives. In our case, the users
and the developers of our CPOE system met together,
and the structured analysis method allowed for very construc-
tive, objective and respectful discussions. At the end, all the
team members mentioned that they appreciated the op-
portunity to participate and gained a much better under-
standing of each other’s constraints.
The FMECA method has begun to be used in the field of
medicine, and several publications have specifically focused
on paediatric chemotherapy electronic prescription.33,34,35
Process reengineering allowed for risk reductions, and all
authors underlined the usefulness of the FMECA analysis
helping them to improve their processes.
The major limitation of FMECA is unavoidable subjectiv-
ity in the selection of failure modes and the determination
of the criticality indices. The team involved should be
large and multidisciplinary to buffer this bias. In our
study, we obtained consensus agreement from all the
members of the team, helping to improve objectivity. The
frequency, the severity and the ability to detect a failure
mode were determined on the basis of explicit criteria,
which also limits subjective variability. The main objec-
tive of FMECA is to stratify risks and to determine orders
ents
ment
CI
Improved 2 CI Feasibility Priority
void systematic alerts) 105 189 2 X
ntra-indication list
ations
126 168 3
in the electronic 105 140 1 X
sis and the therapeutic 147 98 3
a switch according to 90 120 2 X
f the patient name 140 56 1
uments needed for the 42 126 2 X
showing them before 84 63 2
he prescription 72 72 1 X
uments needed for the 28 112 2 X
portant controls
ion
32 80 2
d administration
database
21 28 2
monitoring 16 16 1
WIFI connexion 6 4 2
ium-term, 3 long-term Priority: X  high priority.rovem
prove
lerts (a
tient co
a-indic
signs
iagno
drug
opose
a’s
bility o
of doc
rts, but
dation
uring t
of doc
l of im
escript
ion an
drug
ith the
ility ofof magnitude, so some imprecision is acceptable. Our
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are not generalizable, although the process we used can
easily be generalized. Moreover, most of the failure
modes we defined are also applicable to other institutions,
and our data can be a foundation for the repetition of the
same evaluation with different systems.
Conclusion
We used a well known, simple and cost-efficient methodol-
ogy to quantitatively evaluate safety of various processes
around implementing information technologies in health-
care. This approach confirmed a significant risk reduction by
the implementation of CPOE system and helped in identi-
fying additional system improvements that would have a
strong impact on safety. With the implementation of the
identified improvements, the final potential reduction in
criticality is 50%, in comparison with handwritten pre-
scriptions. Our work demonstrated the usefulness of risk
analysis methods in healthcare processes. A more system-
atic use of these tools in the future may guide and help
prioritise continuous safety improvement in high-risk
medical activities.
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